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Introduction
As is generally known, Lawrence Dewan is one of  the 
most prominent figures of  contemporary Thomism. He 
is especially known for having stressed the importance of  
form in metaphysics; notwithstanding, his presentation 
of  Thomas Aquinas’ esse doctrine has often been 
misunderstood. This is the reason why I felt that it would 
be very useful to publish some conversations I have been 
privileged to have with him which came about due to 
concerns that arose once I had begun to read his writings.
I should note that Lawrence Dewan’s approach to 
Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics, especially his presentation 
on the relationship between form and being, has changed 
our insight into Thomas’s metaphysics subtly but decisive-
ly. Therefore, I am conscious of  the novelty of  his ap-
proach and the difficulties this novelty could cause. I can 
add to this the great influence that Etienne Gilson has had 
on Spanish-speaking Thomists. 
It could be said that there are three central issues 
which provide a break between the readings of  Aquinas 
by Gilson, on the one hand, and by Dewan, on the other. 
These include the sources of  esse and creation doctrines, 
and the relationship between form and being. 
First, there is the issue of  the sources of  the doctrine of  
the act of  being in Saint Thomas. One of  the marks that 
characterizes Gilson’s metaphysical analysis is his efforts 
to show the discontinuity between the Aristotelian view 
of  the ens with respect to that offered by Thomas Aquinas. 
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As a result, this view affected his own view of  sources of  the creation doctrine. 
As is well known, he emphatically refused to believe that one of  these sources 
was Aristotle1. Dewan, in total disagreement with the French professor, 
believes, instead, that Aquinas explicitly acknowledges his debt to Aristotle 
(and even to Plato) for these two really critical issues within Thomism: the 
doctrine of  the act of  being and that of  creation.
Second, we find a central theme in Dewan’s thought and, therefore, in 
these “Conversations,” namely, the form-esse kinship. It seems that the fact 
of  having emphasized predominantly the esse through the background of  a 
struggle against rationalisms led Gilson to shift the form from the core of  
the metaphysical thought of  Thomas Aquinas. If  so, the novelty of  Dewan´s 
approach lies primarily in having given form back the genuine place it deserves 
in metaphysics.2. 
In Gilson´s scheme the essence or form, outside its condition of  an im-
perfect component of  the ens and of  assuming a secondary role, tends to be 
presented as something abstract, as that just apprehended by intelligence. Its 
relationship with the esse would seem to be addressed from a purely logical 
perspective and, therefore, as it were, is static, which is to be expected with all 
existential weight having been attributed almost exclusively to the esse.
Dewan’s vision, instead, is more existential, that is to say that form is viewed 
as playing, together with the esse, the ontological role it deserves, as a prin-
ciple of  being, of  virtus essendi, thanks to the influence of  divine causality. 
Otherwise, as Dewan warns, the risk of  incurring into a logicist conception is 
always there. In fact, this abstract, conceptualist view of  the essence started 
to affect Étienne Gilson´s own perception.
Thus, for those who have been formed under Gilson’s metaphysical view, 
it is certainly not easy to avoid misinterpreting Dewan’s approach3. This is 
1 GILSON, Étienne. God and Philosophy. New Haven: Yale-University Press, 1941, pp. 33-34.
2 It is important to note that, in relation to the causal role of the form, Lawrence Dewan 
considers John Capreolus and his presentation of the doctrine of the esse of Saint Thomas 
as one of his main sources of inspiration. C.f. especially. L. Dewan, Capreolus, St. Thomas, 
and Being, published in French: ‘Capreolus, saint Thomas et l’être”, in Jean Capreolus et son 
temps 1380-1444, Colloque de Rodez, (special number, #1 of Mémoire dominicaine, Paris, 1997: 
Cerf, pp. 77-86). The colloquium took place on Sept. 2-4, 1994.
3 In fact, it should be mentioned that Fr. Dewan was himself a student of Gilson at the 
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why, since I started to read Fr. Dewan’s intellectual production, I felt the need 
to maintain a constant dialogue with him to solve the doubts which appeared 
while reading his work. “Conversations with Fr. Dewan” is the fruit of  these dia-
logues I have been had with him, both personally and by email, from January 
2008 to December 2014.4 
Therefore, the publication of  these conversations is intended to help 
someone else solve the same kind of  doubts and concerns that I myself  had 
after reading Dewan’s writings for the first time. Another objective, perhaps 
not the least, is putting on the table some of  Dewan´s nuclear issues in his 
thinking that question some interpretations that have been made regarding 
Aquinas. These perhaps have been accepted without subjecting them to anal-
ysis and a more rigorous discussion. However, it is important to clarify that 
the style of  this writing only superficially enunciates some topics Dewan has 
dealt with extensively in other places mentioned herein. Hence, I have gath-
ered these conversations and grouped them into the different topics covered 
with Fr. Dewan. Even so, I think that our conversations have always revolved 
around the relation between form and being. Indeed, the following sentence, 
with which Fr. Dewan opened one of  his first emails, defines his intellectual 
route: “My interest has been from the start much inspired by the teaching of  
St. Thomas that esse per se consequitur ad formam”5.
Obviously, all the interest of  these “Conversations” lies in the always master-
ful answers provided by Fr. Dewan. I have just wanted to help readers focus 
on the more salient topics in Lawrence Dewan’s approach to Saint Thomas. 
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto ca. 1954-1957, he began his doctoral 
thesis work for the University of Toronto under Gilson, and finished it under Fr. Joseph 
Owens (once Gilson retired). His doctoral thesis was on the doctrine of esse as taught 
by Johannes Capreolus, the “Thomistarum princeps.” He has criticized Prof. Gilson in, 
among other papers, “Etienne Gilson and the Actus Essendi” (revised version of 1999 
publication), International Journal of Philosophy [Taipei] 1 (2002), pp. 65-99. He also has 
expressed his admiration for Capreolus on esse in “Capreolus, saint Thomas et l’être,” 
in Jean Capreolus et son temps 1380-1444 Colloque de Rodez (special number, #1 of Mémoire 
dominicaine, Paris, 1997: Cerf, pp. 77-86).
4 Unfortunately, our conversations were not as frequent as I would have wished. Sometimes, 
these were interrupted because Fr. Dewan’s state of health or due to both his and my 
own, academic commitments.
5 L. Dewan, O.P., Comunication via e-mail. January 9, 2008.
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To him I express my total gratitude for his patient and wise attention to my 
concerns and questions throughout all these years. I will never be able to pay 
this intellectual debt: that of  an enriching metaphysical learning beside a direct 
disciple of  Saint Thomas Aquinas.6
“Conversations with Fr. Dewan” at February 2015
Dear reader,
By the time that this book has become a physical reality and reaches your hands, 
Fr. Dewan has already passed away. 
I would simply like to say we make take much comfort in knowing that his 
work predicts springtime for Thomism. Those of  us who are fortunate enough to 
regard ourselves as Fr. Dewan’s disciples have a demanding and wonderful challenge 
before us: we must continue his fascinating manner to ‘doing Metaphysics’ and also 
imitate his genuinely Thomistic attitude. Certainly, like his Master, he never sought 
to be famous or to be quoted or appear in the media. As he, himself  wrote to me 
once: “Dear Liliana, I am quite willing to write a brief  forward for the book… 
The reason I have not referred to the letter before is simply that I was a little 
overwhelmed that you have actually undertaken a book about my work. I really am 
very grateful.”7 
6 I dare say this on the basis of the following Fr. Dewan’s answer. In March 2008, I 
asked him: “I would need to know if you are the only or the first author who has taken 
this approach regarding the relationship between form and being.” Fr. Dewan said: 
“I worked it out myself from texts of St. Thomas, and someone else could well have done so 
independently.” [Italics mine].
7 L.Dewan, O.P., Comunication via e-mail. August 14, 2008. (In a previous email I had asked 
him if he could write the foreward to “Tras las huellas del sentido: Sabiduría y felicidad en 
Lawrence Dewan” ).
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1. About the Kinship between  
Form and Being
1. Liliana Irizar: I have the impression that your 
proposal involves, at least, two basic statements. The first 
and fundamental statement is the relevant role form plays 
in constituting created being in St. Thomas’s metaphysics. 
I cannot understand being properly if  I do not give form 
the metaphysical importance that it has. 
As I have understood it, your point is that it would 
be folly for us8 to emphasize esse in such a way that form 
is neglected. On the contrary, both being and form are 
crucial realities of  which the second throws light on 
the first and makes this intelligible for human intellect. 
In other words, “form is the visibility of  esse”9. (“Aristotle as 
a source…”). [Cf. also ST 1-2.85.4 (ed. Ottawa 1179a)]
Precisely for this reason, you defend the view that 
the connection between Aristotle and St. Thomas 
concerning the doctrine of  the nature of  created being 
is closer than that which has been generally thought 
8 I should mention that I had originally used the following words: 
“As I have understood it, your point is that we are not allowed 
to emphasize esse...”, but Fr. Dewan after reviewing the text in 
December 2014 suggested this expression:  “it would be folly for us to 
emphasize esse…”
9 DEWAN, Lawrence, O.P. Aristotle as a Source for St. Thomas’s 
Doctrine of esse. Recovery from the web page of Maritain Center: 
Thomistic Institute hsttp://www.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/
ti00/schedule.htm.
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(In my opinion it is clear, especially in “Aristotle as a source…” and “Saint 
Thomas and Form as Something divine…”).
Comment: First of  all, I would like to tell you that your approach on Saint 
Thomas’s esse doctrine convinces me more than others I have studied so far.
My question is: Do you not think that traditional Thomism would say that 
your approach “forgets” Thomas’s strong insistence on affirming esse (which 
is act, and in this way Aquinas clearly gives more relevance to esse than essentia)? 
Lawrence Dewan: I would say that I do give full credit to the actus essendi. 
In writing the Form as Something Divine paper I happened upon the text which 
seems to me to clear up any ambiguity. The difficulty I had seen was that, on 
the one hand there is a great insistence on form as the principle of being (which 
makes it seem greater than esse, because, as is said in In De caelo 1.6 (62 [5])]:
[Averroes] was deceived in this respect, that he thought the power to be 
[virtutem essendi] to pertain only to passive potency, which is the 
potency of matter; whereas it rather pertains to the potency of form [ potentia 
formae]: because each thing is through its form. Hence, so much and for so 
long [tantum et tamdiu] each thing has of being [habet … de esse], viz. just so much 
as is the power of its form [quanta est virtus formae eius]. And thus, not only in 
celestial bodies but also in separate substances there is the power to be always 
[virtutem essendi semper].
On the other hand, I know that esse is the actuality of  all acts, even of  
the forms themselves. [ST 1.4.1.ad 3.] Thus, the forms of  created things are 
potential relative to esse [ST 1.3.4] in a way which makes them subservient.
In order to understand this “power of  the form,” I should note two texts, 
as follows; first ST 2-2.23.2.ad 3:
Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas operatur formaliter. Efficacia autem 
formae est secundum virtutem agentis qui inducit formam. Et ideo 
quod caritas non est vanitas, sed facit effectum infinitum dum coniungit 
animam deo iustificando ipsam, hoc demonstrat infinitatem virtutis divinae, 
quae est caritatis auctor.
[… Charity operates formally. Now, the efficacy of form is in function of 
the power of the AGENT which introduces the form [into the thing]. 
About the Kinship between Form and Being
19
And therefore the fact that charity is not emptiness, but rather brings about an 
infinite effect, inasmuch as it conjoins the soul to God by giving it righteousness, 
demonstrates the infinity of the divine power, which is the author of charity.]
This I take in conjunction with the doctrine of  DP 7.2.ad 10. It will be 
remembered that the objector holds there that God cannot be ipsum esse be-
cause “esse” is essentially an effect: every being through its essence has esse. 
Thomas’s reply shows why esse, in creatures, has to such a degree the role 
of  an effect. He says that the order of  ends corresponds to the order of  agents, 
in such fashion that to the first agent corresponds the ultimate end, and the 
other ends are proportionate to the other agents. Esse, which is the proper 
effect and the end corresponding to the operation of  the first agent must, then, 
have the role of  ultimate end. But the end, though first in intention, it is last 
in the operation, and is the effect of  the other causes. Therefore, esse was created, 
which is the proper effect corresponding to the first agent and is caused by the 
other principles, though the first principle, i.e. God, is the first cause of  esse.10 
Thus, Thomas provides us with a vision of  the essence and of  the form of  the 
thing as causal relative to the esse of  the thing. These should be considered as 
instruments of  the first principle, i.e. God himself.11 The created esse has the 
role of  final cause. 
All of  this picture, with God as the efficient cause giving power to 
the form, explains why, though the potency of  form is a receptive potency 
[ST 1.104.4.ad 2], it can be active. I see this same sort of  thinking in the ex-
planation of  how the agent intellect, though the most noble of  powers, can 
flow from the essence of  the soul. [ST 1.79.4.ad 5]
I should recall, in this present context, the argument of  Thomas that 
God must be the cause of  the forms by which things are distinguished from 
each other. God is the cause of  being, esse. And esse is through form and not 
10 De Potentia 7.2.ad 10.
11 Cf. also St. Thomas, De veritate 27.1.ad 3 (ed. Leonine, t. 22\3, lines 182-186):
 ... God causes in us natural esse by creation, without the mediation of any efficient cause, but 
nevertheless through the mediation of a formal cause: because natural form is the principle 
of natural esse...
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through matter. Hence, God must be the cause of  form. [SCG 2.43.8 (ed. 
Pera, #1200)]:
Adhuc. Sicut esse est primum in effectibus, ita respondet primae causae ut pro-
prius effectus. Esse autem est per formam, et non per materiam. Prima igitur 
causalitas formarum maxime est primae causae attribuenda. 
[ Just as esse is first among effects, so also it corresponds to the first cause as its 
proper effect. But esse is through form and not through matter. Therefore, the 
first causality of forms is most of all to be attributed to the first cause.]
Esse follows upon form, but this presupposes divine agency: ST 1.104.1.ad 
1: “... esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, supposito tamen influxu 
Dei, sicut lumen sequitur diaphanum aeris, supposito influxu solis.” 
Again, with regard to the question as to whether I am downgrading the 
esse, the act of  being: rather, it should be clear from the paper on “The Dis-
tinction between Form and Esse in Caused Things” that the very distinction 
is being understood by contrast between the esse as most noble and the form 
of  the effect as less noble.
I say:
This is why we must distinguish between the form of the lower thing and the esse 
of the lower thing. The esse, i.e. the being actually, of the caused (or lower) thing 
pertains to the caused thing’s participating in the perfection proper to the nature of 
the higher thing, the nature of the efficient cause as such. The form of the lower thing, 
on the other hand, pertains to the nature proper to the lower thing.12 The two natures 
being different, so also the esse and the form of the caused thing must be diffe-
rent from each other, the esse being the actuality even of the form.13
12 Thus, if we envisage a hierarchy of efficient causes, each one has a composition of form and 
esse, precisely inasmuch as it has above it a higher cause. In demonstrating that one cannot go 
to infinity in ascending an efficient causal hierarchy, one demonstrates that there must exist a 
cause which is first by nature, and so a thing in which form and esse are identical. And this 
is God. - This is, of course, the argument of the “second way” in ST 1.2.3.
13 Cf. DEWAN, Lawrence, O.P. Form and Being. Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics.Washington: 
The Catholic University of America Press, Vol. 45, p. 201.
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2. L.I.: Perhaps some Thomist philosophers would say that “it sounds like 
Platonism.” Even though I don’t think so, this could be a possible objection 
(after reading Aristotle as a source… I understand the last objection is not a 
problem for you because, there, you just affirm a certain type of  relationship 
between Saint Thomas and Plato).
L.D.: I do not think it really sounds like Platonism. It is after all the 
doctrine that form is the principle of  being. This is the doctrine of  Aristotle, 
Metaphysics 7.17 [Thomas, In Metaph. 7.17: 1678-80] and in book 8. If  you like, 
it can be related to Plato, just as Aristotle, in Metaphysics 8, does so relate it (see 
Thomas, In Metaph. 8.3 [1712-14]).
3. L.I.: Another important statement is that to rightly understand St. 
Thomas’ participation doctrine and the nature of  created being, it is neces-
sary to understand the relationship between God and created being. And this 
should be understood by taking into account both the creaturely act of  being 
and the role form plays in that relationship.
As I see this, you propose that the kinship between God and creatures is 
explained and understood better from form and creation as participation by 
likeness of  the divine being (e.g., De Verit., q. 22, a.2, ad.2 and C.G., II, 53). 
According to this, form (more than esse) is, on the one hand, something that 
looks like God (because it is the finite way to have being and so to be like God 
in being). On the other hand, form establishes the infinite difference between 
God and creature, because creatures have a particular nature or form, differ-
ent from the nature of  being; while in God, form and being are identical.
Comment: Thus, I think that your proposal is of  decisive importance to 
enlighten the Ipsum esse doctrine. Question: Do you consider I have rightly 
understood the point that you make?
L.D.: I do not like the expression: “more than esse” in the above. 
While “form” and “likeness” go together, as we see in ST 1.4.3, still the 
likeness in that same text is explained in terms of  “sicut ipsum esse 
est commune omnibus.” We must not forget that esse is “maxime formale 
omnium” [ST 1.7.1]. – We need both form and esse.
Conversations with Fr. Dewan
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In this line you might read my paper which is chapter 3 in the Form and Being 
book, on the seed of  metaphysics, especially at the end. I see our knowledge 
of  esse as needing consideration of  the sort of  form which is other than esse, 
but it is because our intellect has an order to a lower mode of  being than e.g. 
the divine intellect has [cf. ST 1.12.4].
A valuable text concerning the finite modes of  esse in creatures is 
De substantiis separatis c. 8 [para. 88]:
Sed considerandum est, quod ea quae a primo ente esse participant, non 
participant esse secundum universalem modum essendi, secundum quod est in 
primo principio, sed particulariter secundum quemdam determinatum 
essendi modum qui convenit vel huic generi vel huic speciei. Unaquaeque 
autem res adaptatur ad unum determinatum modum essendi secundum 
modum suae substantiae. Modus autem uniuscuiusque substantiae 
compositae ex materia et forma, est secundum formam, per quam pertinet ad 
determinatam speciem. Sic igitur res composita ex materia et forma, per suam 
formam fit participativa ipsius esse a Deo secundum quemdam proprium 
modum.
[But it is to be considered that those things that participate being from the first 
being do not participate being in the universal mode of being, the way it is in 
the first principle, but particularly, in some determinate mode or measure 
of being which befits this genus or this species. Now, each thing is adapted 
to one determinate mode of being in accordance with the mode of its own 
substance. And the mode of each substance composed out of matter and form 
is according to the form, through which it pertains to a determinate species. 
Thus, therefore, a thing composed out of matter and form through its form is 
rendered participative of being itself by God according to some proper mode.]
This works in well with ST 1.14.6 (Ottawa ed. 97b6-31): all that has the 
character of  perfection within the creature, and not just its esse relates to the 
divine esse:
Supra enim ostensum est quod quidquid perfectionis est in quacumque creatu-
ra, totum praeexistit et continetur in Deo secundum modum excellentem. Non 
solum autem id in quo creaturae communicant, scilicet ipsum esse, ad perfec-
tionem pertinet; sed etiam ea per quae creaturae ad invicem distinguuntur, sicut 
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vivere, et intelligere, et huiusmodi, quibus viventia a non viventibus, et intelli-
gentia a non intelligentibus distinguuntur.
Et omnis forma, per quam quaelibet res in propria specie constituitur, perfectio 
quaedam est. Et sic omnia in Deo praeexistunt, non solum quantum ad id quod 
commune est omnibus, sed etiam quantum ad ea secundum quae res distin-
guuntur.
[For it was shown above that whatever of perfection there is in any creature, the 
whole of it preexists and is contained in God in the mode of excellence. Now, 
it is not only that which creatures have in common, viz. being, that pertains to 
perfection, but also those through which creatures are distinguished from each 
other, such as to live, and to understand and the like, by which living things are 
distinguished from non-living things and intelligent things from non-intelligent 
ones. And every form, through which every thing whatsoever is constituted in 
its own species, is some perfection. And thus all preexist in God, not merely 
as regards what is common to all, but also as regards those items according to 
which things are distinguished].
Concerning the above, it shows that when Thomas calls esse the perfection 
of  perfections, he means every word he uses. [DP 7.2.ad 9: perfectio omnium 
perfectionum]
Also, I would say that God is both his being and his form (and they are 
identical). In the Summa contra gentiles we read:
... those things which in creatures are divided are unqualifiedly one in God: 
thus, for example, in the creature essence and being [esse] are other; and in some 
[creatures] that which subsists in its own essence is also other than its essence or 
nature: for this man is neither his own humanity nor his being [esse]; but God is 
his essence and his being.
And though these in God are one in the truest way, nevertheless in God there 
is whatever pertains to the intelligible role [ratio] of the subsisting thing, or 
of the essence, or of the being [esse]; for it belongs to him not to be in another, 
inasmuch as he is subsisting; to be a what [esse quid ], inasmuch as he is essence; and 
being in act [esse in actu], by reason of being itself [ipsius esse].14
14 SCG 4.11 (ed. Pera #3472-3473).
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4. L.I.: When you say that “The likeness of  creatures to God is a case of  
having in common the SAME FORM, but not according to the same ratio”15, 
do you mean community as to natura essendi? 
L.D.: Yes, this is the doctrine of  Summa theologiae 1.4.3: all likeness is 
through having form in common. The “form” Thomas speaks of  in that 
article as common to God and creatures is: “sicut ipsum esse est commune 
omnibus.” Thomas is treating esse as formal: it is “maxime formale omnium” 
(1.7.1); it is the actuality of  all things, even of  the very forms, and is formal 
with respect to everything in the thing, including the particular forms. (1.4.1.ad 
3). – The community is not a univocal one, but analogical, i.e. according to 
priority and posteriority. In Sent. 2.1.1.1, which I quote near the beginning 
of  the “Being as a Nature” paper, Thomas called the act of  being “natura 
entitatis.”
15 See DEWAN, Lawrence, O.P. Thomas Aquinas and Being as a Nature. Acta Philosophica 
12 (2003).
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2. Understanding and  
Misunderstanding Form
5. L.I.: Why is it important to stress the role of  form? 
In other words, which consequences for metaphysics and 
philosophy can be derived from affirming the role of  form 
in the way you do so? 
L.D.: It occurs to me that one might start with the text 
(already quoted) from SCG 4 on the three targets of  meta-
physical attention.
SCG 4.11 (ed. Pera #3472-3473) is a passage from St. 
Thomas which shows the ineluctable variety of  intelligible 
roles of  the three items in the metaphysical analysis:
... it has been shown in the First Book (ch. 31) that those 
things which in creatures are divided are unqualifiedly one 
in God: thus, for example, in the creature essence and being 
[esse] are other; and in some [creatures] that which subsists 
in its own essence is also other than its essence or nature: for 
this man is neither his own humanity nor his being [esse]; 
but God is his essence and his being.
And though these in God are one in the truest way, never-
theless in God there is whatever pertains to the intelligible 
role [ratio] of [1] the subsisting thing, or of [2] the essence, 
or of [3] the being [esse]; for it belongs to him not to be in 
another, inasmuch as he is subsisting; to be a what [esse quid ], 
inasmuch as he is essence; and being in act [esse in actu], by 
reason of being itself [ipsius esse].
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We need to study all three. The task is to understand the proper roles 
of  all three. Then one can ask whether this person or that person obscured 
something.
I would say that in general they [Gilson and Owens, in particular] erred 
by having a too Avicennian doctrine of  esse. One of  my main criticisms of  
Gilson concerns his presenting God as “beyond essence” whereas for St. 
Thomas essence is most truly essence in God. Fr. Owens, with his view of  
the accidentality of  esse, certainly was not adequately honoring Thomas’s 
doctrine of  “esse per se consequitur ad formam.”16
I would also say that their approach leads to a misunderstanding of  the 
relation of  Thomas to Aristotle, and a failure to appreciate Thomas’s own 
reading of  Aristotle. This has some connection with the idea of  creation, and 
the doctrine of  Christian philosophy.
My own lines of  thinking have developed from the need to take seriously 
“esse per se consequitur ad formam” as used in the argument for immortality of  
the human soul.
It has also been a product of  taking Thomas’s Aristotelian Commentaries 
seriously, and taking seriously Thomas’s attributing a doctrine of  creation to 
the philosophers.
All the business of  my pushing form really relates to taking “the per se 
connection” between form and esse seriously. Thus, I speak of  a “kinship” 
between form and esse.
You ask what is the importance of  “the role of  form.” I ask what is the 
role of  each of  the items in the ontological analysis. Unless the role of  each 
is understood, one does not understand things from the viewpoint of  being.
In the particular case of  form, I say, for instance, that the doctrine that 
“being follows upon form because of  what form is” is important for the proof  
of  the immortality of  the soul, but prior to that, it is the central doctrine of  
Aristotle’s Metaphysics’ “central books,” 7 and 8: form is the cause of  being as 
16 Cf. DEWAN, Lawrence, O.P. Being per se, Being per accidens, and St. Thomas’ Metaphysics. 
Science et Esprit 30 (1978): 169-184. Cf. Also chapter 9 in my book, Form and Being: “St. 
Thomas, Metaphysical Procedure, and the Formal Cause.”
Understanding and  Misunderstanding Form
27
being; Aristotle teaches, and Thomas agrees, that metaphysics demonstrates 
primarily by the formal cause. [Chapter 8 in Form and Being book is on this.]
I might add, here, that one’s metaphysical vision would be imperfect if  
one could not appreciate the use of  the notion of  form in a text such as ST 
1-2.85.6, as to whether death is natural. That is why, in my Marquette Aquinas 
lecture, I used that as a “beacon text,” taking us beyond mere mathematical 
form. I would say that many of  those who do not appreciate the role of  
form in existential metaphysics suffer from a merely mathematical concep-
tion of  form. And what do they make of  ST 1.80.1, where Thomas teaches 
that “some inclination follows upon every form”: do they think that this link 
between form and inclination is a mere arbitrary juxtaposition, a per accidens 
association?
6. L.I.: Your conception of  substantial form is more existential because 
it considers the principle of  the act of  being under divine efficacy. With this 
vision of  form, we understand that form can cause being and, at the same 
time, have the role of  active potency related to esse (act). Question: Do you 
think Thomism’s approach to form offers a more-or-less rationalistic view of  
form (form as a concept)? In other words, if  form is not understood in an 
existential way, could we run the risk of  interpreting form in a rationalistic17 
manner?
L.D.: In the above nos. 1 and 3 we were speaking of  the act of  being but 
viewed as something formal in things. Nevertheless, we have to distinguish 
within the thing between that act of  being and the particular form of  the 
thing; thus, as Thomas says, in every material thing we find three items: matter, 
form, and ipsum esse. [cf. Quaestiones de anima, 6:]
In substantiis enim ex materia et forma compositis tria invenimus, scilicet ma-
teriam et formam et ipsum esse. Cuius quidem principium est forma; nam 
materia ex hoc quod recipit formam, participat esse. Sic igitur esse consequitur 
ipsam formam. Nec tamen forma est suum esse, cum sit eius principium.
[... In substances composed out of matter and form we find three [items], viz. 
matter, and form, and, [as a] third, esse, whose principle is form. For matter, by 
17 Lawrence Dewan’s addition in December 2014: “I could add here that what you mean 
by “rationalistic” is what I was getting at above with the word “mathematical.”
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the fact that it receives form, participates in esse. Thus, therefore, esse follows upon 
form itself, nor nevertheless is form its own esse, since it is its principle (cum sit eius 
principium).]18
On the one hand the form is potential relative to the esse (cf. ST 1.3.4); on 
the other hand, the form is the cause of  the esse. These two points had always 
seemed to me somewhat at odds with each other, until I noticed the text of  
ST 2-2.23.2.ad 3, that the form gets its power from the agent which instills it 
(and in this case of  causing form and esse, the cause is God).
What about “more existential” presentation? – Again, I would say that 
our first task is to understand the role of  the act of  being [actus essendi] in the 
presentation of  the finite being. Why is there a distinction, a real distinction, 
between the form and the act of  being in caused substances? Certainly, to 
bring out the point that form is the cause of  esse, the formal cause of  esse, 
brings out the “existential” character of  form itself. When I want to focus 
on the “existential” role of  form, I regularly refer to ST 1-2.85.6, on whether 
death is natural; remember the teaching:
… corruptions and defects of things are natural, not according to the inclination 
of form, which is the principle of being and perfection, but according to the inclination 
of matter….
And he continues:
… And though every form intends perpetual being as much as it can, 
nevertheless no form of a corruptible thing can achieve its perpetuity, other 
than the rational soul, by the fact that it is not altogether subject to corporeal 
matter as are the other forms.19
18 I translate “cum” here as “since” rather than “though”, because a few lines below it twice 
clearly means “since”.
19 Thomas, ST 1-2.85.6:
 … corruptiones et defectus rerum sunt naturales, non quidem secundum inclinationem formae, 
quae est principium essendi et perfectionis; sed secundum inclinationem materiae…
 Et quamvis omnis forma intendat perpetuum esse quantum potest, nulla tamen forma rei 
corruptibilis potest assequi perpetuitatem sui, praeter animam rationalem, eo quod ipsa 
non est subiecta omnino materiae corporali, sicut aliae formae.
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Thomas had already taught, in ST 1.80.1, that “some inclination follows upon 
every form whatsoever” [… quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio…]. 
He also taught, in ST 1.42.1 ad 1, that the two effects of  form are being [esse] and 
operation [operatio].
Nevertheless, one must be careful of  the whole idea of  “existentiality” 
of  the doctrine. It can mean the very dissociation between form or essence 
and existence that I am criticizing. I see both Gilson and Owens as having 
succumbed to the fault that Thomas accuses Avicenna of  having committed, 
viz. placing the act of  being in an accidental connection with the essence. 
Cf. Thomas, In Metaph. 4. 2 (558):
… [Avicenna] seems not to have spoken rightly [concerning being]. For the esse 
of the thing, though it is other than [the thing’s] essence, nevertheless is not to 
be understood as something added on after the manner of an accident; rather, it 
is in the role of something constituted by the essential principles [quasi constituitur 
per principia essentiae.].
7. L.I.: Is there a way to summarize why Gilson and Owens fell into the 
same error as Avicenna? 
L.D.: I will suggest at least one possible reason. First of  all, I think that it 
involves confusion between the “esse” which expresses the “actus essendi” and 
the “esse” which signifies the truth of  propositions. We see this confusion 
discussed in ST 1.3.4.ad 2; the objector has argued against the identity of  
essence and esse in God, on the grounds that we know that God is or exists, 
but we do not know what God is. Thomas’ reply is that in one use of  the 
word “esse” it signifies the act of  being; in another, it signifies the truth of  
propositions expressed by the soul in conjoining the subject to the predicate. 
Thomas says that we do not know the actus essendi of  God, just as neither do 
we know his essence: thus, we do not know the esse of  God. It is only in the 
truth meaning that we know the esse of  God: we know that the proposition 
we form concerning God, when we say: “God is,” is true, and this we know 
from his effects.
Now, this “is”, the “is” of  truth, is important, as it expresses our testimony 
about extra-mental reality. This is so whether we are speaking of  there being a 
dog in front of  me or there being blindness in some person’s eye. Blindness, 
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of  course, has no “act of  being,” yet we say that it exists, it is really to be found, 
in this or that person. [Cf. my paper: “Which esse Gives the Answer to the 
Question: ‘is it?’ for St. Thomas,” Doctor Communis, N.S. 3 (2002), pp. 80-97.]
In a similar way, we can conclude that the infinite act of  being exists, 
though we cannot conceive of  that infinite act of  being.
I say all this as a lead up to the fact that my teachers had had to battle 
against various forms of  idealism: Cartesian, Kantian, etc. One of  the glories 
of  Thomism, as we learnt it, was its epistemological realism. Thus, the 
“existence” of  things, “outside the mind,” was very important.
I conjecture that this battle with idealism encouraged a sort of  focus on 
“existence” that led to confusion of  the two meanings of  “esse.”
I see this situation in quite another setting with such people as Anthony 
Kenny and Norman Kretzmann; the latter says that existence is “too thin” 
a predicate to be what anything is; thus, one cannot say that it is the essence 
of  God. To such people, “existence” is what we say about anything that 
exists, even blindness. (Cf. My paper: “St. Thomas, Norman Kretzmann, and 
Divine Freedom in Creating”, Nova et vetera [English language ed.], Vol. 4, 
No. 3 (2006): pp. 495-514, at pp. 510-511.)
What I do to focus on St. Thomas’s doctrine of  the act of  being, actus 
essendi, is to consider the terminus of  generation. Thus, esse is the actuality of  the 
nature. This is a very different “existence” than the “existence” of  blindness.20
I reproduce here a paragraph from my paper on “Kenny on Being”:
20 Cf. SCG 1.26.6 (Pera #242): Item. Generatio per se loquendo est via in esse, et corruptio 
via in non esse: non enim generationis terminus est forma et corruptionis privatio, nisi 
quia forma facit esse et privatio non esse; dato enim quod aliqua forma non faceret esse, 
non diceretur generari quod talem formam acciperet.
 Si igitur deus sit omnium rerum esse formale, sequetur quod sit terminus generationis. 
Quod est falsum: cum ipse sit aeternus, ut supra ostensum Est. [Generation, speaking 
properly, is the approach to being, and corruption the approach to not being; for form 
is not the terminus of generation and privation that of corruption, save because form 
brings about being and privation not being; for, given that some form did not bring 
about being, that which received such a form would not be said to be “generated.” 
Therefore, if God were the formal being of all things, it would follow that he is the 
terminus of generation. Which is false, since he is eternal, as was shown above.]
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He [Kenny] does not see form as the cause of  esse simpliciter, but only of  
esse quid, relative to the matter. [cf. note 11, p. 31; the Latin is Kenny’s] Already 
from the point of  view of  vocabulary this view of  Kenny’s is alarming. Thus, 
in the early treatise De principiis naturae, c. 1, Thomas explains: 
Be it known that something can be though it is not, whereas something else is. 
That which can be is said to “be in potency”; that which already is, is said to “be 
in act”. But being [esse] is twofold: viz. the essential or substantial being of the thing, as 
for example: being a man; and this is “being” in the unqualified sense [esse simpli-
citer]. The other is accidental being, for example, that the man is white; and this 
is “being something”.21
For Thomas, “being a what” and “being unqualifiedly” go together: i.e. esse 
quid is esse simpliciter. I would say Kenny fails to grasp the existential importance 
of  generation and hylomorphism; a thing that is corrupted ceases to be. 
Yes, matter is “incorruptible”, but only in the way that matter “is” at all.22
21 De principiis naturae, c. 1:
 Nota quod quoddam potest esse licet non sit, quoddam vero est. Illud quod potest 
esse dicitur esse potentia; illud quod iam est, dicitur esse actu. Sed duplex est esse: 
scilicet esse essentiale rei, sive substantiale ut hominem esse, et hoc est esse 
simpliciter. Est autem aliud esse accidentale, ut hominem esse album, et hoc est esse 
aliquid.
 And we see this in many texts throughout Thomas’s career. Cf. ST 1.5.1.ad 1:
 … cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habeat 
ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quod primo 
discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei 
uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter.
 And ST 1.76.4:
 … forma substantialis in hoc a forma accidentali differt quia forma accidentalis non 
dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale, sicut calor facit suum subiectum non simpliciter esse, 
sed esse calidum. … Forma autem substantialis dat esse simpliciter, et ideo 
per eius adventum dicitur aliquid simpliciter generari, et per eius recessum simpliciter 
corrumpi.
22 Indeed, while Thomas appeals to the incorruptibility of matter when arguing that God 
will not annihilate things (cf. ST 1.104.4), it is also part of that picture that matter can 
only be incorruptible as participating in actuality through a form: cf. ST 1.46.1.obj. 1 
(if you have matter, you must have form and a world), and DP 5.7.in toto and ad 11.
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The question for me is what Kenny means by “esse simpliciter”, such that he 
distinguishes it from “esse quid”? In the main text which his note 11 comple-
ments, Kenny writes:
When Aquinas says that form gives esse to matter, all that he can mean is that 
form makes matter to be the kind of thing it is; he cannot mean that it brings 
matter into existence. When a substantial change takes place, no new matter 
enters the world, but matter that already existed under one form begins to exist 
under another. [p. 31]
What this suggests to me is that Kenny’s word “existence” really refers to the 
answer to the question: “does it exist?” rather than to the act of  being [actus essendi].23
Thomas’s word “esse”, though it does the work of  signifying the answer to the 
question: “does it exist?” (thus signifying the truth of  propositions), also signifies 
the thing’s own act which is “to be”, as meaning the perfection which terminates 
a thing’s generation.24 It is what characterizes, we may also say, the effect of  an 
efficient cause, which, in giving form to matter, gives the thing its peculiar existence.25
[End of  excerpt]
The short answer to your question, Liliana, is that I think the doctrine of  
existence of  some Thomists has been infected by the need to fight for the 
extramental existence of  things against idealists. This has led to a confusion 
between the two meanings of  “esse” given in ST 1.3.4.ad 2.
8. L.I.: I think that to stress only the primacy of  esse can lead to an abstract 
and logicist view of  form (this is in contrast with some present-day philoso-
23 Cf. ST 1.3.4.ad 2. I notice in the above-mentioned review by Jörgen Vijgen that at p. 217 
he criticizes Knasas for insufficiently distinguishing “between esse as actual existence 
and esse as the intrinsic act of being (actus essendi).” Without making any judgment here 
about Knasas, I would insist that the word “existence” is ambiguous, and must be used 
at times not only for the answer to the question “does it exist?” but also for the intrinsic 
act of being. My point is that K uses the word “existence” exclusively for the answer to 
the question “does it exist?”
24 Cf. Sent. 1.33.1.1.ad 1on meanings of “esse”. For the connection of the act of the essence 
with terminus of generation, cf. e.g. SCG 2.52 (para. 7; ed. Pera, #1279) and 1.26 (para. 
6; ed. Pera. #242).
25 DEWAN, Lawrence, O.P. “On Anthony Kenny’s Aquinas on Being,” Nova et Vetera 
[English Language edition] 3 (2005), pp. 335-400, at pp. 339-341.
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phers, who say that to enhance form is a logicist approach to Saint Thomas’ 
metaphysics). 
L.D.: Yes, real “existentiality” of  the form is had by stressing its kinship, 
its per se connection, with esse.
9. L.I.: When you say that to bring out form involves viewing things from 
the point of  view of  being, do you mean that when we enhance form we 
enhance the real character of  the kinship between form and being, so by 
understanding the role of  form we understand being in its entire significance? 
In other words, we need to understand the role of  these targets of  metaphysical 
attention if  we want to understand things as beings. I am asking this because 
one could think that to remark that the role of  form would lead us to see 
things from the point of  view of  form. (I am sure this is wrong but I would like to 
know what you mean).
L.D.: All this discussion reminds me of  the question: are we seeing the 
glass with the water in it as “half  full” or “half  empty”? - It is true that the 
substantial forms of  creatures are other than their act of  being. The substan-
tial form is potential relative to the act of  being. However, its mode of  potency 
to esse is not the same sort of  thing as matter’s mode of  potency towards 
form and esse.
In fact, in Thomas’s In De caelo 1.6 [dated by Weisheipl as “Naples 1272-
1273”] we have this:
… [Averroes] manifestly has spoken against Aristotle who below, in this very 
book, locates in perpetual things a power to be always [virtus ad hoc quod sint 
semper]. But [Averroes] was deceived in this respect, that he thought the power 
to be [virtutem essendi ] to pertain only to passive potency, which is the potency 
of matter; whereas it rather pertains to the potency of form [ potentia formae]: 
because each thing IS through its form. Hence, so much and for so long 
[tantum et tamdiu] each thing has of being [habet … de esse], viz. just so much as is 
the power of its form [quanta est virtus formae eius]. And thus, not only in celestial 
bodies but also in separate substances there is the power to be always [virtutem 
essendi semper]. [In De caelo 1.6 (62 [5])]
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This is a doctrine regularly featured by Thomas, and especially in proving 
the incorruptibility of  pure subsisting forms such as the angels and the hu-
man soul: cf. especially ST 1.50.5, but also in many places. Thus, proving that 
God the creator must be the first cause of  the forms of  things, Thomas argues 
that God is the cause of  esse, and esse is through form! [SCG 2.43 (#1200)]; 
cf. also DP 7.2.ad 10.
How can one understand the being (esse) of  things if  one does not 
understand its principle, which is form? [“… All esse is considered through 
form…!”] ST 1-2.85.4: Omne enim esse et bonum consideratur per aliquam 
formam, secundum quam sumitur species.
Perhaps this text from De substantiis separatis c. 8 will help:
Sed considerandum est, quod ea quae a primo ente esse participant, non partici-
pant esse secundum universalem modum essendi, secundum quod est in primo 
principio, sed particulariter secundum quemdam determinatum essendi modum 
qui convenit vel huic generi vel huic speciei. Unaquaeque autem res adaptatur 
ad unum determinatum modum essendi secundum modum suae substantiae. 
Modus autem uniuscuiusque substantiae compositae ex materia et forma, est 
secundum formam, per quam pertinet ad determinatam speciem. Sic igitur res 
composita ex materia et forma, per suam formam fit participativa ipsius esse a 
Deo secundum quemdam proprium modum.
Invenitur igitur in substantia composita ex materia et forma duplex ordo: unus 
quidem ipsius materiae ad formam; alius autem ipsius rei iam compositae ad esse 
participatum. Non enim est esse rei neque forma eius neque materia ipsius, sed 
aliquid adveniens rei per formam.
Notice this, the very presentation of  esse as “something coming to the 
thing through the form.” This, of  course, is St. Thomas’s constant doctrine, 
and the one I have been insisting on. If  one starts with the De ente et essentia, 
the very word “essentia” is explained as relating to the fact that “in it and 
through it the being has being, [Sed “essentia” dicitur secundum quod per 
eam et in ea ens habet esse].
Notice this introductory passage in the De ente et essentia which speaks of  
the hierarchy of  being to be discussed. Thomas explains:
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... But because “ens” is said absolutely and primarily of substances, and poste-
riorly and in a somewhat qualified sense of accidents, thus it is that essentia also 
properly and truly is in substances, but in accidents it is in a certain measure and 
in a qualified sense. But of substances, some are simple and some are composite, 
and in both there is essentia; but in the simple in a truer and more noble degree 
[ueriori et nobiliori modo], inasmuch as they also have more noble esse; for they are 
the cause of those which are composite, at least [this is true of ] the first simple 
substance which is God.26
This picture of  “truer and more noble” essence in separate substance, and 
“more noble esse” as related to causal hierarchy, means that the nature of  essence 
and form is found more truly the higher one goes in reality: far from holding 
that God is “beyond essence” (as Gilson wanted Thomas to say), essence is 
most truly essence in God, where essence is identical with esse!
This is why I insist on the text in SCG 4.11:
... those things which in creatures are divided are unqualifiedly one in God: 
thus, for example, in the creature essence and being [esse] are other; and in some 
[creatures] that which subsists in its own essence is also other than its essence or 
nature: for this man is neither his own humanity nor his being [esse]; but God is 
his essence and his being.
And though these in God are one in the truest way, nevertheless in God there is 
whatever pertains to the intelligible role [ratio] of the subsisting thing, or 
of the essence, or of the being [esse]; for it belongs to him not to be in another, 
inasmuch as he is subsisting; to be a what [esse quid ], inasmuch as he is essence; 
and being in act [esse in actu], by reason of being itself [ipsius esse].27
I think we should underline that forms and essences are imitations of  the 
divine essence.
DV 2.1:
… quaelibet res imitatur aliquo modo deum, sed imperfecte; unde et diversae 
res diversimode deum imitantur, et secundum diversas formas repraesentant 
unam simplicem dei formam, quia in illa forma perfecte unitur quidquid 
perfectionis distinctim et multipliciter in creaturis invenitur…
26 De ente et essentia [henceforth “EE”] c. 1 (ed. Leonine, lines 53-63).
27 SCG 4.11 (ed. Pera #3472-3473).
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Cf. also ST 1.14.6:
Non solum autem id in quo creaturae communicant, scilicet ipsum esse, 
ad perfectionem pertinet; sed etiam ea per quae creaturae ad invicem 
distinguuntur, sicut vivere, et intelligere, et huiusmodi, quibus viventia 
a non viventibus, et intelligentia a non intelligentibus distinguuntur. 
Et omnis forma, per quam quaelibet res in propria specie constituitur, perfectio 
quaedam est.
I think that the great thing is to avoid the accidentality of  esse that Thomas 
criticized in Avicenna. Cf. In Metaph. 4.2 (558):
Sed in primo quidem non videtur [Avicenna] dixisse recte. Esse enim rei quam-
vis sit aliud ab eius essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquod 
superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia 
essentiae. Et ideo hoc nomen ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem 
cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia.
We should ask ourselves what is the nature of form as such, that it is 
able to fulfil the role of  completing the proper subject of the act of being. 
Cf. SCG 2.54 [ed. Pera #1291:
Deinde quia ad ipsam etiam formam comparatur ipsum esse ut actus. 
Per hoc enim in compositis ex materia et forma dicitur forma esse principium 
essendi, quia est complementum substantiae, cuius actus est ipsum esse: 
sicut diaphanum est aeri principium lucendi quia facit eum proprium subiectum 
luminis.
Cf. also ST 1.104.1.obj. 1 and ad 1.
10. L.I: Could we say that for Gilson essence is passive potency? Even 
though I don’t have found this precise expression in him, I think it could be 
deduced that this was the idea that he had in mind.
L.D.: I would not say “passive potency,” but rather the picture of  essence he 
(Gilson) eventually comes to stresses its finitude - I wonder if  you have ever seen 
the script of  the radio program I gave concerning Gilson as “a 20th century 
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apostle”28? I will attach a copy. We see there how Gilson gradually makes 
essence what makes possible the existence of  beings distinct from God.
Thomas’s doctrine, on the other hand, has essence most truly essence in God. 
This is the message of SCG 4.11.
11. L.I.: If  form is active power, how come it contains all the potencialities 
of  entity? Because, in fact, St. Thomas says that the human soul is the cause 
of  its powers, but is human soul perfectioned by its powers (which are acci-
dents) or is it because of  matter?
L.D: Clearly, we have to consider ST 1.77.6: the powers of  the soul flow 
from the essence of  the soul. Cf. also 1.79.4.ad 5. Perhaps most especially 
[the following is taken from my Marquette lecture]:
It is the divine influence which makes possible the causal role of  the form. 
As we read in a passage concerning the causal role of  the virtue of  charity:
. . . Charity operates formally. Now, the efficacy of form is in function of the 
power of the agent which introduces the form [into the thing]. And therefore the fact 
that charity is not vanity, but rather brings about an infinite effect, inasmuch as it conjoins the 
soul to God by giving it righteousness, demonstrates the infinity of the divine power, which is 
the author of charity29.
28 DEWAN, Lawrence, O.P. Émission radiophonique sur Étienne Gilson dans la série: “Penseurs et 
apôtres du 20e siècle”. [Published in print as “Étienne Gilson”, in Jean Genest (ed.), Penseurs 
et Apôtres du XXme Siècle, (Montreal), Fides, 2001, pp. 170-182.] There Fr. Dewan says : “…
Gilson devient tellement impressioné par la doctrine de l’acte d’être, en contredistinction 
d’avec l’essence, que l’essence commence à souffrir. Gilson continue d’insister qu’une 
métaphysique doit apprécier l’essence, et pas seulement l’existence, mais on voit qu’il 
conçoit l’essence comme incluant la finitude. Gilson aurait aimer lire chez saint Thomas 
une doctrine qu’il trouve chez le philosophe arabe ou perse, Avicenne (mort en 1037 
après le Christ), à savoir que Dieu n’a pas d’essence. Dire que Dieu est l’acte pure d’être 
serait dire que ce que nous appelons “essence” dans les créatures ne se trouve vraiment 
pas en Dieu.”
29 ST 2-2.23.2.ad 3:
 Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas operatur formaliter. Efficacia autem formae est secundum 
virtutem agentis qui inducit formam. Et ideo quod caritas non est vanitas, sed facit effectum 
infinitum dum coniungit animam deo iustificando ipsam, hoc demonstrat infinitatem 
virtutis divinae, quae est caritatis auctor. [Italics mine]
 The “vanity” of the creature is, of course, a recourse by the objector to the language of 
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In the light of  this divine influence we can see why the form of  the crea-
ture, though as other than being it is necessarily potency with respect to the 
act of  being, is nevertheless “efficacious” with respect to that act. The situa-
tion also recalls how the agent intellect, though a participation in supe-
rior intellect, nevertheless can flow from the essence of  the soul as do 
the other powers. Thomas teaches:
… since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect, 
nothing stands in the way of the power which is participated from the supreme 
intellect, [the power] by which it abstracts from matter, proceeding from its 
essence, just as the other powers.30
[End of  excerpt]
I am also reminded that I have a treatment of  the soul and the powers 
flowing from it in my paper on “nature as a metaphysical object.” I don’t 
know whether Liliana has this. I will send a copy.31
12. L.I.: I have been rereading Forment’s Comment on De ente et essentia.32 
Whereas I understand that for you BOTH esse and form ARE PERFECTIONS 
OF ENS [yes!: read ST 1.14.6, quoted above],33 in Forment’s comment we 
can read: “In its maxima perfection, being is always limited or diminished 
by essence which expresses this limitation grade. If  two entities differ 
e.g. Psalm 38.6, characterizing the creaturely substance, and man in particular, as a mere 
shadow. Cf. Thomas, In psalm. 38.4, where many Biblical parallels are given.
30 ST 1.79.4.ad 5.
31 DEWAN, Lawrence, O.P. “Nature as a metaphysical object”. This paper was written 
for and read at the Summer Thomistic Institute, Maritain Center, University of Notre 
Dame (Indiana, U.S.A.), July 13-20, 2001. It was published first on their web page. 
It now appears as Ch. 12 in my book, Form and Being: Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics, 
Washington, D.C., 2006: CUA Press.
32 FORMENT, Eudaldo. Traducción, estudio preliminar y notas a Tomás de Aquino: 
El ente y la esencia. Pamplona: EUNSA, 2002.
 Note: I would like to mention that our questionings regarding Forment’s analysis on 
the relationship between form and being in no way should be understood as casting 
doubt on our gratitude and appreciation of Professor Forment, who is one of the most 
important contemporary Thomists as well as an excellent person.
33 Fr. Dewan’s added note.
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it is because the own being of  one of  them is limited in certain measure 
and another’s being in another. So, if  one of  them has more perfection 
it is not because of  its essential specification but because its being is less limited 
(less imperfect).”34
[This is not so. The higher essence or form is intrinsically a higher 
principle of  esse. The esse is less limited because it is the esse had 
through such an essence.]35
Next Forment quotes Domingo Báñez: 
Even though esse itself, as being received in essence composed by essential prin-
ciples, is specified by them, nevertheless esse in being specified does not receive 
any perfection, rather it is demoted and downgraded to a relative being, such as 
being a man or an angel which are not absolute perfection.36
L.D.: It is certainly true that esse is not participated by the creature as 
having the universal mode that it has in God. Created esse is proportioned 
to the mode of  the created substance. This is said in the passage from the 
De substantiis separatis I quoted earlier. And it is certainly true that the esse 
is not receiving its perfection from the essence, as from an efficient cause. 
Nevertheless, [De potentia 7.2.ad 10] the essence or form is the instrument of  
the first principle, God, in providing an act of  being. The power of  the form 
is the power of  the agent providing the form. Cf. recall the following (that I 
used in the Marquette paper):
34 “En su máxima perfección, el ser siempre es limitado o imperfeccionado por la esencia, 
que expresa esta medida grado de limitación. Si dos entes difieren es porque el ser propio 
de uno está limitado en una determinada medida, y el ser del otro está restringido 
en distinto grado. Y si uno de ellos posee una mayor perfección no es por advenirle una 
determinación esencial, sino porque su ser está menos imperfeccionado.” FORMENT, 
Eudaldo. Traducción, estudio preliminar y notas a Tomás de Aquino: El ente y la esencia, 
p. 78. [Italics mine].
35 Fr. Dewan added this note after reviewing “Conversations” in December 2014.
36 “Aunque el mismo ser, al recibirse en la esencia compuesta de principios esenciales, sea 
especificado por ellos, sin embargo, en esto que es especificado ninguna perfección 
recibe, sino más bien es deprimido y rebajado a ser relativo, como el ser hombre, el ser 
ángel, que no son una perfección absoluta.” BÁÑEZ. Domingo. Scholastic Commentaria in 
primam partem Summa Theologicae. Madrid: Ed. L. Urbano, 1934, Vol. I, p. 141a. Quoted by 
Forment at p. 79.
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…. Charity operates formally. Now, the efficacy of form is in function of the 
power of the agent that introduces the form [into the thing]. And therefore the 
fact that charity is not vanity, but rather brings about an infinite effect, inasmuch 
as it conjoins the soul to God by giving it righteousness, demonstrates the infi-
nity of the divine power, which is the author of charity.37
We are always supposing the divine influence as efficient cause; esse follows 
upon form, supposing the divine influence: ST 1.104.1ad 1.
13. L.I.: I should mention that Forment’s commentary adds that: “Essen-
tial principles in specifying being limit its perfections. These principles do not 
give being any perfection. Since that limited esse, which is in ens, is an act, the 
first actuality, it is not able to receive anything.”38 And, in order to uphold his 
statement, Forment quotes the following Saint Thomas’ text:
Illa vero quae tantum sunt, non sunt imperfecta propter imperfectionem ipsius 
esse absoluti: non enim ipsa habent esse secundum suum totum posse, sed 
participant esse per quendam particularem modum et imperfectissimum. S.C.G. 
I. 28.
L.D.: Notice that this text is not speaking about all levels of  created being. 
It is answering an implied objection to the doctrine that God is “not other 
than his esse.” The objection is understanding this doctrine as putting God 
on the level of  the things that merely are, as contrasted with those that are 
and live. (See the opening words of  SCG 1.28.) Thomas, having explained 
the perfection involved in God as ipsum esse, concludes the lesson by pointing 
out that what “merely is and does not live” is participating esse in the most 
37 ST 2-2.23.2.ad 3:
 Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas operatur formaliter. Efficacia autem formae est secundum 
virtutem agentis qui inducit formam. Et ideo quod caritas non est vanitas, sed facit effectum 
infinitum dum coniungit animam deo iustificando ipsam, hoc demonstrat infinitatem 
virtutis divinae, quae est caritatis auctor. [Italics mine]
38 “Los principios esenciales al especificar al ser lo que hacen es limitar sus perfecciones. 
No le comunican ninguna perfección. El ser ya limitado, que es el que incluye el ente, 
no ha podido recibir nada porque es acto, la primera actualidad.” FORMENT, Eudaldo. 
Traducción, estudio preliminar y notas a Tomás de Aquino: El ente y la esencia, p. 79.
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imperfect way. – I.e., other creatures participate esse in more perfect ways, but 
obviously all creatures fall infinitely short of  the divine perfection.
I would caution that one should not envisage the divine “ipsum esse subsistens” 
as “esse without essence.” Rather, as Thomas says, in e.g. ST 1.3.2, God is “per 
essentiam suam forma.” And as I pointed out earlier, the divine essence is most 
truly essence.
14. L.I.: Let me tell you my own reading of  both positions (Forment 
and yours). I think that to say form means “perfection” and say form means 
“imperfection” do not imply a contradiction. It depends on that what we 
mean by imperfection in each case. Certainly, you assume (with Saint Thomas) 
that in comparing form to esse, form is a potentiality and therefore involves 
imperfection. But it is necessary to emphasize why form is also “perfection.” 
It is something which you do, but most Thomists do not. As I see it, we 
need to understand the kinship between form and being in a more balanced 
way, a way which entails admitting being as perfectissimum omnium and without 
demoting form but recognizing how form contributes to ens’ perfection 
under another aspect, viz., “to see form is to see totality, completeness…” 
Form provides identity for being. But I do not know whether I am right. 
L.D.: I would say that you are quite right. A good text, too, is in the 
Q.D. de immortalitate animae: De immortalitate animae ad 17, viz. that “form” 
and “act” are among the things predicated analogically of  diverse things: 
“… forma et actus et huius modi sunt de hiis que analogice predicantur de 
diversis.” (ed. Kennedy, p. 222). This is to say that the nature of  form as form is 
found more truly in the higher, more perfect real izations.39
However, since this is so, I would not say that “form means imperfection.” 
Of  course, everything is “imperfect” relative to the divine perfection. Created 
form falls short of  the perfection to be attributed to created esse; this is not 
because it is form, but because it is “such” form. [Cf. Saint. Thomas saying 
that some form cannot exist except as perfecting matter, but this is not true 
of  it “as form” but as “such form”].
39 Cf. KENNEDY, Leonard A. (Ed.). A New Disputed Question of St. Thomas Aquinas 
on the Immortality of the Soul. In Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge. 
N° 45 (1978): pp. 205-208 (introduction) and 209-223 (text).
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I wonder whether you have ever seen my paper “against metaphysical ma-
terialism.”40 It was supposed to be in the Form and Esse book, but the editor 
cut it. I will add a copy to this email.
15. L.I.: Some Thomists like to compare esse with a liquid which fills 
different recipients. The shape of  each recipient is form. But the relevant point 
here is that the recipient is created as the liquid fills it. This picture tries to 
represent the idea that the total actuality of  form comes from esse. Thus, the 
entire entity of  form comes from esse for which form is the recipient. So, 
form can only become a recipient of  esse in so far as form receives esse. 
L.D.: I notice your teacher’s expression: this picture tries to represent the 
idea that the total actuality of  form comes from esse. Thus, the entire entity 
of  form comes from esse to which form is a recipient.
The question is whether one envisages esse as “giving its actuality” to the 
form, or whether esse “is the actuality of  form.” I would stress the latter.
I have nothing against speaking of  a reception of  esse by form; a very good 
text is Qq. de anima 6.ad 10:
… agens per motum reducit aliquid de potentia in actum; agens autem sine 
motu non reducit aliquid de potentia in actum, sed facit esse actu quod se-
cundum naturam est in potentia ad esse, et huiusmodi agens est creans.
[… that which acts through movement reduces something from potency to act, 
but that which acts without movement does not reduce something from po-
tency to act, but rather makes to be in act that which according to its 
own nature is in potency towards being; and an agent which creates is of 
this sort.]
It occurs to me that you might be helped in all this by a paper I wrote on 
Capreolus and being. I will attach a copy of  the English translation (it was 
published in French).
40 Fr. Dewan is referring to the paper St. Thomas Aquinas against Metaphysical Materialism. 
En Atti del’ VIII Congresso Tomistico Inernazionale. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana. 
V (1982): pp. 412-434.
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I would say that the great thing to avoid in conceiving of  the composition 
of  form or essence and esse is making the esse an efficient cause of  the essence 
(as Gilson explicitly did in his book Being and Some Philosophers. Here is a note 
I wrote in the Capreolus paper:
We might recall that Gilson, in Being and Some Philosophers, p. 172, actually 
presented the substantial esse of  the creature as a sort of  intrinsic efficient cause. 
He said:
... Actual existence, then, is the efficient cause by which essence in its turn is 
the formal cause which makes an actual existence to be “such an existence” 
[my italics].
BSP dates originally from 1949, with a second edition “corrected and 
enlarged” in 1952 (from which 2nd edition the above quotation comes); the 
Cajetan paper was published in 1953. In the later paper, “Virtus Essendi”, 
Mediaeval Studies 26 (1964), pp. 1-11 (in French), at p. 5, he seems to be 
correcting this view of  his own. This latter paper deserves severe criticism as 
well (though the mentioned correction is welcome), but that is for another 
occasion.
[End of  Capreolus paper excerpt.]
Another thing that I am trying to combat is the Gilson idea that “essence” 
means something found only in creatures. That is why I stress the text from 
SCG 4.11:
... those things which in creatures are divided are unqualifiedly one in God: 
thus, for example, in the creature essence and being [esse] are other; and in some 
[creatures] that which subsists in its own essence is also other than its essence or 
nature: for this man is neither his own humanity nor his being [esse]; but God is 
his essence and his being.
And though these in God are one in the truest way, nevertheless in God there is 
whatever pertains to the intelligible role [ratio] of the subsisting thing, or 
of the essence, or of the being [esse]; for it belongs to him not to be in another, 
inasmuch as he is subsisting; to be a what [esse quid], inasmuch as he is 
essence; and being in act [esse in actu], by reason of being itself [ipsius esse].41
41 SCG 4.11 (ed. Pera #3472-3473).
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“Essence” does not name something secondary. If  it did, it would not be 
found in God in its own intelligible role.
Rather, as I use a text in the De ente et essentia to argue, essence is found most 
truly in God. Essence is other than esse only inasmuch as it is “such” essence:
Thomas explains:
... But because “ens” is said absolutely and primarily of substances, and posteriorly 
and in a somewhat qualified sense of accidents, thus it is that essentia also pro-
perly and truly is in substances, but in accidents it is in a certain measure and in 
a qualified sense. But of substances, some are simple and some are composite, and 
in both there is essentia; but in the simple in a truer and more noble degree [ueriori 
et nobiliori modo], inasmuch as they also have more noble esse; for they are the cause 
of those which are composite, at least [this is true of] the first simple substance 
which is God.42
Here, essence, esse, and efficient causality are in a parallel hierarchy with 
God at the summit.
It does not just “happen” that essence and esse are identical in God. One 
cannot do without the notion of  essence if  one wants to speak truly of  God’s esse. 
Thus, in the question as to whether “Qui est” is the primary divine name, we 
are told:
… hoc nomen « qui est » triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen Dei. Pri-
mo quidem, propter sui significationem. Non enim significat formam aliquam, 
sed ipsum esse. Unde, cum esse Dei sit ipsa eius essentia, et hoc nulli alii con-
veniat, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc maxi-
me proprie nominat deum, unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma. [ST 
1.13.11 (ed. Ottawa, 89a20-30)]
“Who is” does not signify “formam aliquam”, i.e. a particular form, but 
rather signifies “ipsum esse” which is his essence: a name expresses the essence 
or form of  a thing. The middle term here is precisely the notion of  essence 
or form. We cannot go “beyond form,” “beyond essence.”
42 De ente et essentia, c. 1 (ed. Leonine, lines 53-63).
Understanding and  Misunderstanding Form
45
Another line of  consideration I note from the text ST 1-2.85.4: Omne 
enim esse et bonum consideratur per aliquam formam, secundum quam su-
mitur species.
To consider esse, one must consider the form that it perfects. This reminds 
me again of  the error of  which I accused Antony Kenny. He wanted to dis-
tinguish between “being a what” and “simply being.” Essence would supply 
“being a what” but existence would provide that whatness with “unqualified 
being.”
I wrote:
[Kenny] does not see form as the cause of  esse simpliciter, but only of  esse 
quid, relative to the matter. … Already from the point of  view of  vocabulary 
this view of  Kenny’s is alarming. Thus, in the early treatise De principiis naturae, 
c. 1, Thomas explains: 
Be it known that something can be though it is not, whereas something else is. 
That which can be is said to “be in potency;” that which already is, is said to “be 
in act.” But being [esse] is twofold: viz. the essential or substantial being of the thing, as 
for example: being a man; and this is “being” in the unqualified sense [esse simpli-
citer]. The other is accidental being, for example, that the man is white; and this 
is “being something”.43
43 De principiis naturae, c. 1:
 Nota quod quoddam potest esse licet non sit, quoddam vero est. Illud quod potest esse 
dicitur esse potentia; illud quod iam est, dicitur esse actu. Sed duplex est esse: scilicet 
esse essentiale rei, sive substantiale ut hominem esse, et hoc est esse simpliciter. 
Est autem aliud esse accidentale, ut hominem esse album, et hoc est esse aliquid.
 And we see this in many texts throughout Thomas’s career. Cf. ST 1.5.1.ad 1:
 … cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habeat 
ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quod primo 
discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei 
uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter.
 And ST 1.76.4:
 … forma substantialis in hoc a forma accidentali differt quia forma accidentalis non 
dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale, sicut calor facit suum subiectum non simpliciter esse, 
sed esse calidum. … Forma autem substantialis dat esse simpliciter, et ideo per eius 
adventum dicitur aliquid simpliciter generari, et per eius recessum simpliciter corrumpi.
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For Thomas, “being a what” and “being unqualifiedly” go together: i.e. esse 
quid is esse simpliciter. I would say K. fails to grasp the existential importance 
of  generation and hylemorphisme; a thing that is corrupted ceases to be. 
Yes, matter is “incorruptible”, but only in the way that matter “is” at all.44
What is special in creatures is not that they have an essence and an act of  
being, but that these two must be distinct, and that the essence or form must 
be potential relative to the act of  being.
[I might add here a reminiscence of  Thomas’s De ente et essentia, Ch. 1 
[ed. Leonine, lines 49-52], as to the word: “essence”. He says:
“Quiditatis” vero nomen sumitur ex hoc, quod per diffinitionem significatur. 
Sed “essentia” dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse.
16. L.I.: It is correct to say that form and being are co-principles or are 
they simply principles of  ens? 
L.D.: I would shy away from calling form and esse “co-principles of  ens.” 
I recall the doctrine of  De potentia 7.2.ad 10, where it is explained why esse has 
the role of  effect of  the other causes. I think, also, that calling esse a “princi-
ple” leads to a depreciation of  Thomas’s doctrine that “esse per se consequitur ad 
formam.” Form is the principle of  esse. (C.f. among other texts, Aquinas, 1996, 
Qq. de anima 6):
In substantiis enim ex materia et forma compositis tria invenimus, scilicet ma-
teriam et formam et ipsum esse. Cuius quidem principium est forma; nam 
materia ex hoc quod recipit formam, participat esse. Sic igitur esse consequitur 
ipsam formam. Nec tamen forma est suum esse, cum sit eius principium. 
Et licet materia non pertingat ad esse nisi per formam, forma tamen in quantum 
est forma, non indiget materia ad suum esse, cum ipsam formam consequatur 
esse; sed indiget materia, cum sit talis forma, quae per se non subsistit.
44 Indeed, while Thomas appeals to the incorruptibility of matter when arguing that God 
will not annihilate things (cf. ST 1.104.4), it is also part of that picture that matter can 
only be incorruptible as participating in actuality through a form: cf. ST 1.46.1.obj. 1 (if 
you have matter, you must have form and a world), and DP 5.7.in toto and ad 11.
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[In substances composed out of matter and form we find three [items], viz. 
matter, and form, and, third, being [esse], of which [being] the principle 
is form. For matter from the fact that it receives form participates in being. 
Thus, therefore, being follows upon the very form, nor nevertheless is 
the form its own being [suum esse], since it is its principle. And though 
matter does not attain to being except through form, form, nevertheless, 
inasmuch as it is form, does not need matter for its [form’s] being, since 
being follows upon form itself; but it needs matter since it is such form 
[talis forma] as does not subsist by itself.]
Form and esse are hardly “co-principles”, in that one is the principle of  the 
other; notice that in the foregoing Latin text the word “cum” has the sense of  
“since.”
Moreover, I would follow Capreolus:
Esse is not to be conceived as something which has […] esse, nor as a principle 
of esse or of a being, but as the disposition and the act of a being inasmuch as it 
is a being.45
I discuss this in my paper: “Capreolus, saint Thomas et l’être,” in Jean 
Capreolus et son temps 1380-1444 Colloque de Rodez , pp. 77-86). 
17. L.I.: Would it be correct to say that the goodness of  a being is in its 
form?
L.D.: You ask whether it would be correct to say that the goodness of  a 
being is “in its form.” I would say that the goodness is in whatever pertains 
to the perfection of  a thing: thus, in ST 1.5.5, while form is on the scene, still 
the form presupposes some things and some things follow when the form 
is present. Thus, the modus, species, order triad is a better presentation of  
goodness, than just the form.
45 Esse enim non debet concipi per modum alicujus habentis realitatem vel esse, nec 
per modum principii essendi vel entis, sed per modum dispositionis et actus entis in 
quantum ens. (Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis I, 328a).
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Also, it looks as though many of  your concerns stem from the question 
of  the distinction between esse and form. A good place to consider would be 
ST 1.6.3. 
Another, I repeat, is ST 1-2.85.4:
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in Primo dictum est, modus, species et ordo 
consequuntur unumquodque bonum creatum inquantum huiusmodi, et 
etiam unumquodque ens.
Omne enim esse et bonum consideratur per aliquam formam, secundum 
quam sumitur species.
Forma autem uniuscuiusque rei, qualiscumque sit, sive substantialis sive 
accidentalis, est secundum aliquam mensuram, unde et in VIII Metaphys. dicitur 
quod formae rerum sunt sicut numeri. Et ex hoc habet modum quendam, qui 
mensuram respicit.
Ex forma vero sua unumquodque ordinatur ad aliud.
Sic igitur secundum diversos gradus bonorum, sunt diversi gradus modi, 
speciei et ordinis. Est ergo quoddam bonum pertinens ad ipsam substantiam 
naturae, quod habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et illud nec privatur nec 
diminuitur per peccatum. Est etiam quoddam bonum naturalis inclinationis, 
et hoc etiam habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et hoc diminuitur per 
peccatum, ut dictum est, sed non totaliter tollitur, etc. 
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3. Aristotle, the Esse and the Form
18. L.I.: Some Thomists say that Aristotle’s notion of  
form does not go beyond the predicamental level. In this 
level, form is, indeed, what makes something a specific 
thing. In this regard, we can say that form “gives esse”. But 
on the transcendental level, form receives esse and is an active 
potency which receives its entire actuality from esse. On this 
level, it is esse which makes something a specific thing because 
esse is the most intimate item in the created thing. I suspect 
that, some Spanish Thomists differ significantly from you 
regarding this last point.
Thus, some professors assert that for Saint Thomas, esse 
has ABSOLUTE priority on form. If  God’s form is identical to 
his esse, it is just because the form which “specifies” God is 
his own esse. For them, this confirms, once again, to what 
extent esse is more relevant than form. 
L.D.: There is no doubt that the act of  being, esse, is 
“perfectissum omnium.” (ST 1.4.1.ad 3); “… hoc quod dico 
‘esse’ est inter omnia perfectissimum: quod ex hoc patet quia 
actus est semper perfectio potentia. Quaelibet autem 
forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod 
esse ponitur. ” (DP 7.2.ad 9). 
That is why I am so happy to find the text I use in 
the Marquette “Form as something divine” paper, the 
text from ST 2-2.23.2.ad 3: here is what I say, and where I 
conclude with that 2-2 text:
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The form, just as it mediates creation, mediates the divine influence which 
conserves the creature throughout its existence. As Thomas says:
…. the act of being accompanies the form of the creature, supposing nevertheless 
God’s influence, just as illumination follows upon the transparency of the air, 
supposing the influence of the sun.46
It is the divine influence which makes possible the causal role of  the 
form. As we read in a passage concerning the causal role of  the virtue of  
charity:
…Charity operates formally. Now, the efficacy of form is in function of the 
power of the agent which introduces the form [into the thing]. And therefore the 
fact that charity is not vanity, but rather brings about an infinite effect, inasmuch as it conjoins 
the soul to God by giving it righteousness, demonstrates the infinity of the divine power, which 
is the author of charity.47
In the light of this divine influence we can see why the form of the creature, 
though as other than being it is necessarily potency with respect to the act 
of being, is nevertheless “efficacious” with respect to that act.
[End of  excerpt]
As for the limiting of  form’s contribution to the “predicamental” as dis-
tinct from the “transcendental” I would like to see the text of  Thomas on 
this. We certainly have Thomas in such texts as I quoted earlier:
46 ST 1.104.1.ad 1:
 . . . esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, supposito tamen influxu dei, sicut lumen 
sequitur diaphanum aeris, supposito influxu solis.
47 ST 2-2.23.2.ad 3:
 Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas operatur formaliter. Efficacia autem formae est secundum 
virtutem agentis qui inducit formam. Et ideo quod caritas non est vanitas, sed facit effectum 
infinitum dum coniungit animam deo iustificando ipsam, hoc demonstrat infinitatem 
virtutis divinae, quae est caritatis auctor. [Italics mine]
 The “vanity” of the creature is, of course, a recourse by the objector to the language of 
e.g. Psalm 38.6, characterizing the creaturely substance, and man in particular, as a mere 
shadow. Cf. Thomas, In psalm. 38.4, where many Biblical parallels are given.
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St. Thomas, De veritate 27.1.ad 3 (ed. Leonine, t. 22\3, lines 182-186):
... God causes in us natural esse by creation, without the mediation of any efficient 
cause, but nevertheless through the mediation of a formal cause: because natural 
form is the principle of natural esse. . . .
A discussion of  creation sounds “transcendental” to me. And recall De 
potentia 7.2.ad 10, also discussed earlier.
Also there is the text SCG 2.43.8 (ed. Pera, #1200) quoted earlier: to say 
that since esse is the proper effect of  the highest cause, i.e. God, he must be the 
first cause of  the forms, because esse is through form, is hardly a consideration 
at a “predicamental” as contrasted with a “transcendental” level. 
19. L.I.: Could we say that Thomists, in general, “have forgotten” form? 
If  so, does it have some relationship with the topic of  the sources for Saint 
Thomas’ doctrine of  esse?
L.D.: One can say that some Thomists have “demoted” form, taken from 
it its crucial role in the being of  things.
There is a relation to the topic of  the sources of  esse. I would say that 
the focussing upon creation, and a particular imagining of  creation, in the 
interests of  presenting Christianity as making a revolutionary contribution 
to metaphysics, led to a failure to appreciate how “already existential” the 
ancient Greek interest in form was. (That is somewhat the line in my paper 
on Aristotle as a source of  Thomas’s doctrine of  esse.) 
20. L.I.: I think that the “forgetfulness” of  form would not have been so 
relevant if, especially in the case of  Gilson, these Thomists would not have 
had so much influence in some Thomistic circles. I say this because I was 
educated in Argentina (where Thomism has received a great influence from 
Gilson and Maritain) and in Barcelona University (both thinkers have been 
greatly revered in the Thomist circle there). Thus, it is not strange that my 
professors emphasized esse quite exclusively. 
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Now, it is necessary to let you know that, at least in the case of  my pro-
fessors, I never heard them saying that the connection between form and esse 
was per accidens. However, they have always stressed esse in such a way that one, 
as a student, ends up underestimating form.
L.D.: It is true that the explicit “per accidens” doctrine is from Joseph 
Owens; he probably had less influence in Latin America, but his influence 
was quite considerable in the USA and in Toronto. (He was a Gilson student, 
and it is possible that the student make explicit what is implicit in things said 
by the master, but which the master would not have liked to say.) [On Owens, 
see the papers referred to above in n. 16]
Maritain was less inclined to depreciate essence than was Gilson; 
he worried about Gilson going too far in that direction.
21. L.I.: I would like you to read this quotation I obtained from another 
book by Forment: 
Saint Thomas’s doctrine of esse as an act is based on Aristotle’s doctrine of act, 
but the first doctrine involves a deep transformation in respect to the second. 
For Thomas, essence is not only an essential act, but it is a potency or ability in 
respect to esse which is, consequently, its actuality; a constitutive act not of essen-
ce but ens. This potency-act relationship between essence and esse does not have 
the same meaning for Saint Thomas as for Aristotle, because for the former 
this relationship is analogical but for the latter it is univocal. Essence and esse 
do not have the same kind of relationship as matter and form or substance and 
accidents. These two entities’ constitutive items are not only different but they 
also belong to a diverse order.48 
I would be very grateful if  you could to clarify this.
48 “La doctrina del ser como acto se basa en la del acto de Aristóteles, pero implica una 
profunda modificación. Se comprende la esencia no sólo como acto esencial, sino 
también como potencia o capacidad con respecto al ser, el cual es así su acto, un acto no 
constitutivo de la esencia sino del ente. Esta relación potencial-actual entre la esencia y el 
ser no tiene un significado idéntico a la potencia y acto aristotélico, porque no se toma en 
un sentido unívoco sino análogo. La esencia y el ser no se relacionan igual que la materia 
y la forma, ni como la substancia y los accidentes, porque los dos constitutivos del ente 
no sólo son diferentes, sino que además pertenecen a un orden distinto”. FORMENT, 
Eudaldo. Medieval Personalism, Madrid, EDICEP, 2002, p. 186. 
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L.D: I will only give a few indications. I start from a trust in Thomas’s 
own reading of  Aristotle. Thus, in De substantiis separatis Thomas attributes 
to Aristotle and to Plato a distinction between potency and act in immaterial 
substances, taking them as they issue from the first principle. Now, this is 
what Thomas calls the distinction between the nature of  the thing and its 
act of  being. That is why Thomas attributes to both of  them (Plato and 
Aristotle) a doctrine of  creation.
So I say that, in discussing the differences between Aristotle and Thomas, 
one should take into account what Thomas saw himself  as saying, and that 
he saw the same thing in Aristotle. This does not mean that it is as clearly said 
there (in Aristotle), but it does affect one’s view of  both authors.
Here I refer to a passage in my paper: “Thomas Aquinas, Creation, and 
Two Historians”, Laval théologique et philosophique 50 (1994), pp. 363-387.] I am 
discussing Thomas’s De substantiis separatis:
The second area of agreement [between Plato and Aristotle] discussed by Thomas 
is what he calls “the condition of the natures” [... ad conditionem naturae ipsarum ...] of 
the substances under discussion. What Thomas means by their “condition” is to 
be gathered from the context. Whereas “modus existendi” concerned the question of 
origin, i.e. having one’s being “measured” by a relationship to an efficient cause,49 
“conditio naturae” looks within the substance itself, probes its intrinsic ontological 
density, if one may so put it. Both Plato and Aristotle, Thomas tells us, held that 
all such substances are altogether immune from matter. Nevertheless, they are not 
altogether immune from the composition of potency and act. For the case of Plato, 
Thomas points out that when something is received in a being as a participated 
feature, it has the role of act vis-à-vis the participating substance. Hence, in the 
doctrine of Plato, all the substances other than the supreme are potency/act 
composites. And it is necessary to say the same thing according to the doctrine 
of Aristotle.50 Aristotle holds that the intelligible aspects expressed by the terms 
49 On the relation called “measure of being and truth”, see Thomas’s In Metaph. 5.17 (Cathala 
#1003); on “modus” (i.e. “measure”), as pertaining to a thing’s being proportionate to 
its efficient cause, see ST 1.5.5 (31a39-42). As Thomas says in In Metaph. 5.17 (Cathala 
#1027), summing up the discussion of “measure of esse”: “Everything is measured by 
that on which it depends”; this is clearly not “measure” in the properly quantitative sense, 
but demands a conception of ontological hierarchy, and an appreciation of the extent to 
which the cause, as cause, is principle of knowledge (“measure”) of the effect.
50 Here we have another instance of the expression: “secundum sententiam Aristotelis”, which 
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“true” and “good” are to be attributed to what he calls “act”: hence, the primary 
true and the primary good must be pure act, and whatever fall short of this must 
have an admixture of potency.51
This passage is interesting in that we clearly have to do with the ontology of  
separate substance, not with questions pertaining to operation. Does Thomas 
attribute to Plato and Aristotle a doctrine of  composition out of  “essence and 
existence” (to use the terminology of  the controversies in later centuries)? 
At this point in the text, he uses a more general vocabulary. However, what we 
should especially note is the way Thomas exploits the content of  discussion in 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics 9, chapters 9 and 10, tying it to the views of  books 2 and 
12: Thomas is telling us how he reads Aristotle.52
is generally of importance for our discussion.
51 SS 3, Leonine lines 22-39 (tr. Lescoe, pp. 30-31).
52 See my paper, “The Number and Order of St. Thomas’s Five Ways,” Downside Review 92 
(1974), 1-18 (especially pp. 11-17), for an indication of the importance for Thomas of the 
presentation of act and potency in Aristotle’s Metaph. 9.6 and 9.8-10.
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4. More Metaphysics…
22. L.I.: When we explain the sources of  Thomas’ esse 
doctrine, now, after reading your work, I understand that 
Plato and Aristotle are two primary sources. But, my ques-
tion is: what is the role of  Avicena in this history? In fact, 
my professors taught me that Thomas, on this topic, had 
received direct influence of  Avicena. Saint Thomas would 
have found the esse doctrine in Avicena.
L.D: There is no doubt that St. Thomas learned 
much from Avicenna. As I say in my paper: “Discussion: 
On Anthony Kenny’s Aquinas on Being” (pp. 336-337):
In general, it has seemed to me that Thomas was always fun-
damentally Aristotelian, and that, if anything, he became 
more thoroughly so as he went along; that he benefited from 
the work of Avicenna and Averroes in this respect, and that 
he exercised critical discernment about them all. In his ear-
lier work Avicenna is very prominent: he notably criticizes 
Avicenna in DP in favour of Averroes, as to some creatures 
having absolutely necessary being (DP 5.3.in corp. and ad 12); 
but while Avicenna is criticized as regards the accidentality 
of the act of being in In Metaph. 4.2 (556 and 558) he is prai-
sed in the same In Metaph. re the inclusion of matter in the 
essence of material things, and thus as having the authentic 
view of Aristotle In Metaph. 7.9 (1469). Averroes, while he 
is praised for his view of the existence of necessary beings 
in DP, is criticized in In Phys.53 for his failure to understand 
Aristotle on the cause of being as being (In Phys. 8.2, ed. 
Maggiolo, #974 [4] - 975 [5]).54
53 Aquinas (1954). In octo libris Physicorum Aristotelis expositio.
54 C.f. also In De caelo 1.6.5, where Averroes is seen to misunderstand 
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We must certainly ask ourselves why the line of argument concerning essence 
and esse so famously present in De ente et essentia and In Sent. is not repeated in later 
works, and notably not in SCG 2.52.
[End of  excerpt]
[In the last words above I am referring to the so-called “intellectus essentiae” 
argument.]
What is most important in Thomas’s criticism of  Avicenna is Thomas’s 
rejection of  the accidentality of  esse in creatures. I think that this Avicennian 
doctrine affected seriously Fr. Owens reading of  St. Thomas.
23. L.I.: You say that God causes the nature of  being, and thus the essential 
properties of  that nature (the necessary and the contingent, the corruptible 
and the incorruptible, the fallible and the infallible). Question: Are these not 
the properties of  every mode of  being, for example, the properties of  every 
created essence? I do not understand what you could mean by nature of  being 
without the presence of  form. 
L.D.: I mean that Thomas treats the act of  being, ipsum esse, as a nature 
or form. One can see this in ST 1.4.2 (second argument in the body of  the 
article), where ipsum esse is compared to heat. The idea is that a nature has 
proper differences. The example for this is whole number: because of  the 
very nature of  whole number, it is necessary that a whole number be either 
odd or even. These follow from what it is to be a whole number. Thomas is 
saying that there are differences that pertain to what it is to be a being. Thus a 
being is either corruptible or incorruptible, i.e. is such that it can be or not be, 
or else is such that it cannot not be. It is because God is the cause of  the na-
ture of  being that he is the cause of  things being necessary in their substantial 
being (like the human soul) or merely possible regarding substantial being 
(any corruptible substance). [Notice e.g. ST 1.48.2 where it is mentioned that 
these grades are found “in ipso esse.”]
You say “without the presence of  form.” Did I speak of  esse without form 
being present? Not that I know of. In fact, they are indissociable; they are 
identical in the case of  God; they are “akin” in creatures; my point in the 
the potentiality which belongs to form with respect to being.
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“Being as a Nature” paper was that even if  one isolates the act of  being for 
consideration, one is forced to speak of  “its own nature” and what belongs 
to that nature, i.e. as properties. Thus, “nature” has a “transcendental” role in 
our discussion of  being.
24. L.I: Another important point deals with the difference between esse 
and existence. Regarding this, one was taught that the right translation of  esse 
is being but not existence because, for Saint Thomas, existence is a mere effect 
of  esse (it means “to be out of  causes”, ex-sistere). Now, all beings are “out of  
causes,” from an angel to a stone. Only esse makes the difference between created 
beings and puts each of  them in a specific category on the scale of  being. Because of  this, 
we should translate being in place of esse but not of  existence. My question is: 
Is this true? If  so, where does Saint Thomas mention this?
L.D.: No, this is not true. However, the real situation is complex. Quite 
apart from translation, “esse” has three different meanings. Cf. St. Thomas, 
In 1 Sent. 33.1.1.ad 1: Sometimes it means the essence of  the thing, sometimes 
the truth of  the proposition, sometimes the actuality of  the essence: 
Sed sciendum, quod “esse” dicitur tripliciter. [1] Uno modo dicitur “esse” ipsa 
quidditas vel natura rei, sicut dicitur quod “definitio est oratio significans quid 
est esse;” definitio enim quidditatem rei significat. [2] Alio modo dicitur “esse” 
ipse actus essentiae; sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus, est animae actus; 
non actus secundus, qui est operatio, sed actus primus. [3] Tertio modo dicitur 
“esse” quod significat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus, secun-
dum quod “est” dicitur copula: et secundum hoc est in intellectu componente 
et dividente quantum ad sui complementum; sed fundatur in esse rei, quod est 
actus essentiae, sicut supra de veritate dictum est, dist. 19, quaest. 5, art. 1.
In many places Thomas indicates the two meanings: the “actus essentiae” 
or “actus essendi”, on the one hand, and the truth of  the proposition, on the 
other hand. Less often does he mention the third meaning, i.e. the essence 
itself.
Notice the following passage from my Marquette lecture, Form as Something 
Divine in Things [in the real text ca. note 97]:
Conversations with Fr. Dewan
Central Metaphysical Topics with Lawrence Dewan, O.P.
58
So considering the situation one could call the form itself  the “being” of  
the resulting thing, and that is exactly how Aristotle speaks in Metaph. 8:
Clearly, then, the word “is” [to esti ] has just as many meanings; a thing is a 
threshold because it lies in such and such a position, and its being [to einai ] means 
its lying in that position, while being ice means its having been solidified in such 
and such a way.55
As St. Thomas notes, “being” in such a text refers to the proper intelligible 
character of  the thing. We read:
[Aristotle] says, firstly, that because the aforementioned differences are 
constitutive of the things spoken of above, it is evident that the “being” [ipsum 
esse] of the aforementioned things is said in as many ways as there are differences. 
For the difference completes the definition signifying the being [esse] of the 
thing. For such an item is a threshold because it is so positioned. And thus its 
being so positioned is its being [esse ipsius], that is, its proper intelligible character 
[ propria eius ratio]. And similarly, the being of ice is the very having been so 
solidified.56
I point this out, not only to recall that Thomas himself  indicates here 
and elsewhere this use of  the word “esse,”57 but to insist that there is good 
55 ARISTOTLE. Metaph. 8.2 (1042b25-28) (italics in the Ross tr.).
56 THOMAS, In Metaph. 8.2 (1894):
 Dicit ergo primo, quod quia praedictae differentiae sunt constitutivae rerum de quibus 
supra dictum est, manifestum quod ipsum esse praedictarum rerum toties dicitur quot 
sunt differentiae. Differentia enim complet definitionem significantem esse rei. Limen 
enim est huiusmodi, quia ita ponitur. Et ipsum sic poni est esse ipsius, idest propria eius 
ratio. Et similiter esse crystalli, est ipsum taliter inspissari.
57  In Metaph. 7.3 (1310):
 But it must be known that in all the following, by the expression “being this” [hoc 
esse] or “being for this” [huic esse], he means the quod quid erat esse of that thing: for 
example, “being for man” [homini esse] or “being man” [hominem esse]: he means that 
which pertains to the “what is man.”
 At Sent. 1.33.1.1.ad 1 [ed. Mandonnet, pp. 765-766], three meanings of “esse” are 
given: the nature of the thing, the act of the essence (as “living” is the being of living 
things), and the truth of propositions. These meanings are given again in Sent. 3.6.2.2 
[ed. Moos, #79, p. 238].
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reason for such usage, and that it reflects the intimacy of  the relation between 
the form and the act of  being, i.e. the act which Thomas teaches is not to be 
identified with the form.
[End of  excerpt]
Now, for the purposes of  your question we can set aside “esse” as meaning 
the essence, and concentrate of  “esse” as meaning the act of  being, and as 
meaning the truth (cf. especially ST 1.3.4.ad 2 and 1.48.2.ad 2 [which is about 
“ens” but is the same point].)
The “esse” of  truth is related to the question: “does it exist?” or “Is there 
any such thing?” This “esse” is thus said even of  blindness, which has no essence 
and no act of  being (cf. ST 1.48.1). What one should notice is that in its 
respect the word “exist” is very readily used: “does the bad exist?” “Does 
evil exist?” “Is the bad found in things?” – I would say that it is this sense of  
“exist” that is most often meant in English; notice that people involved in 
English analytic philosophy, such as Peter Geach, Antony Kenny, Norman 
Kretzmann, are unable to accept Thomas saying that God’s essence is “ipsum 
esse subsistens”, i.e. “the subsistent act of  being”, because they see this as saying 
God is “pure existence” and they take “existence” as answering the question: 
“does X exist?” They thus say that “esse” is “too thin a predicate” to be what 
anything is. [I mentioned this earlier.]
Thus, there is no doubt that “being” or “the act of  being” is the best 
translation of  “esse” when “esse” is synonymous with “actus essendi” 
(ST 1.3.4.ad 2). (And, generally, “being” is the best translation, always, 
for the Latin “esse.”)
Now, all of  the discussion with Gilson and Owens and Maritain relates 
to the actus essendi, also truly called the actus essentiae (cf. De potentia 5.4.ad 3). 
– And I am afraid that they are confusing it with the “being” or “exist” that 
signifies the truth of  the proposition. (which makes it accidental).
Thus, for your question of  translation, I would translate “esse” by “being” 
as much as possible. I say this about all three cases that Thomas speaks of. 
It is the most fundamental word in English.
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Nevertheless it can also be translated as “existence.” We see this in St. 
Thomas’s own usage. Take, for instance, ST 1.14.3, as to whether God 
comprehends himself:
Manifestum est autem quod Deus ita perfecte cognoscit seipsum, sicut perfecte 
cognoscibilis est. Est enim unumquodque cognoscibile secundum modum sui 
actus, non enim cognoscitur aliquid secundum quod in potentia est, sed secun-
dum quod est in actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys.. Tanta est autem virtus Dei in 
cognoscendo, quanta est actualitas eius in existendo, quia per hoc quod 
actu est, et ab omni materia et potentia separatus, Deus cognoscitivus est, ut 
ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod tantum seipsum cognoscit, quantum 
cognoscibilis est. Et propter hoc seipsum perfecte comprehendit.
There, Thomas is using the verb “existere” in place of  “esse,” and is applying 
it to God himself. (Obviously, for Thomas, “existere” does not imply being 
“outside its cause.”) 
Again, take De substantiis separatis c. 14:
Amplius. Sicut causa est quodammodo in effectu per sui similitudinem 
participatam, ita omnis effectus est in sua causa excellentiori modo secundum 
virtutem ipsius. In causa igitur prima omnium, quae Deus est, oportet omnia 
eminentius existere quam etiam in seipsis. Quod autem est in aliquo, oportet 
quod in eo sit secundum modum substantiae eius. Substantia autem Dei est 
ipsum eius intelligere. Oportet igitur omnia quae quocumque modo sunt in 
rebus, in Deo intelligibiliter existere secundum eminentiam substantiae eius. 
Necesse est igitur Deum perfectissime omnia cognoscere.
Clearly, here “existere” is being used as synonymous with “esse.”
The point about “existere” and “out of  a cause”, as though to say “to 
exist” is for a thing “to stand outside its cause”, extra causas sistere: I have 
heard this said, but it does not seem to be in St. Thomas’s line of  thinking. 
(I could find no such statement from Thomas using a search engine.) He uses 
the word as synonymous with “esse” even when speaking about the being of  
God. [ex stare is the true etymology of  the word “exist,” but the etymology is 
not necessarily the meaning of  the word.]58
58 I am reminded of a remark of G.K. Chesterton, in the Preface to his book, Alarms and 
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Nevertheless, my general practice is to use the words pertaining to the 
verb “to be” as much as possible in translating “esse.” Save “exist” for when 
it is similar in Latin: “existere.” “Ens” I translate as “a being” because in 
English we do not have a concrete word as “ens” is used in Latin (“ens” 
can be translated as “an entity” sometimes, but of  course, there is the Latin 
“entitas” to distinguish from “ens”).
25. L.I.: Explaning substance you say that “substance is an object of  
mind.” We don’t catch it by senses. My question is: if  we affirm that substance 
is different from the sensible unity which is captured by senses, would we not 
be identifying substance and essence? If  so, why do we say that substance has 
esse and essence? 
L.D.: I take it that you are asking about my saying that “substance is an 
object of  mind” or intellect. It would help to know just where you are reading 
me saying this. Still, surely to know a substance as a substance is to grasp the 
thing from the viewpoint of  being. A dog or a cat does know substances, but not 
as such. The best they can do, I would think, is to grasp them in function 
of  some sort of  object of  the vis aestimativa. [e.g. “the source of  food” or 
“shelter”]
With the human being one has to move first to the doctrine of  the vis 
cogitativa, the prelude to the universal; but still, it is only after the fully universal 
notion has been obtained by the intellect that one turns back to the sense powers 
to view the universal as existing in the particular (ST 1.84.7 and 1.86.1). I would say 
that what you have in mind as “the substance” is the subsisting thing, which of  
course is an individual, a particular. If  you then form the proposition: “Peter 
is a being”, surely “being” there means “substantial being”, not something in 
a category of  accident.
Discursions, New York, 1911: Dodd, Mead and Company, p. v:
 If I were constrained to put my moral philosophy in one sentence, I could not do it 
more satisfactorily (to myself) than by saying that I am in favour of alarums and against 
alarms. It is vain to tell me that these two words were the same once and come from 
a common derivation. The people who trust to derivations are always wrong: for they 
ignore the life and adventures of a word, and all that it has done since it was born. People 
of that sort would say that every man who lives in a villa is a villain. They would say that 
being chivalrous is the same as being horsey.
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26. L.I.: Saint Thomas’s definition of  essentia in the Ente et Essentia is as 
follows: “Sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet 
esse.” Could we say that this definition can be divided in two parts?
• “Per eam” would mean the essence as a cause of  esse.
• “In ea” would mean the essence as a principle of  permanence and 
conservation of  esse.
I don’t know if  this interpretation is correct.
L.D.: Yes: I think that the “in ea” is making the same point as Thomas 
makes in the SCG 2.54.para. 5 (ed. Pera #1291):
Per hoc enim in compositis ex materia et forma dicitur forma esse principium 
essendi, quia est complementum substantiae, cuius actus est ipsum esse: sicut diaphanum 
est aeri principium lucendi quia facit eum proprium subiectum luminis.
Cf. also ST 1.104.1.ad 1.
27. L.I.: Does God continue creating reality? (as the Roman Cannon says), 
or did He create things one way and they developed because of  “seminal 
reasons” which run through the whole creation? Where does Saint Thomas 
say this?
L.D.: St. Thomas is generally inclined to find all subsequent acts of  cre-
ation (even that of  individual human souls) somehow reducible to the work 
of  the six days (and seventh day) of  Genesis. Consider ST 1.73.1.ad 3 (and 
the whole article). Read also 1.73.2.
28. L.I.: During our talks in Ottawa, I understood that, according to you, 
Metaphysics is not necessarily in the third level of  abstraction. Even though, 
Saint Thomas in the Comment of  Boecio´s De trinitate situates Metaphysics 
there, you told me, as far as I remember, something like we should consider 
the context in which Thomas said it. I would be very grateful if  you could 
explain what that point is here. I have to put this in the book, in the part 
where I must explain Aristotle’s definition of  Metaphysics as a science which 
studies the separated and immobile substances.
More Metaphysics…
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L.D.: I certainly follow St. Thomas in distinguishing three modes of  
abstraction (as regards the first operation of  the intellect.). On this the text I 
follow is ST 1.85.1.ad 2.
The third mode, abstracting from all matter, is proper to the metaphysical 
objects such as being, unity, act and potency. One cannot do metaphysics 
without using such notions. However, they are primary for the human mind. 
This is expressly so as regards “being”, as I have argued in such papers as 
“St. Thomas and the Seed of  Metaphysics” and “St. Thomas, Physics, and 
the Principle of  Metaphysics,” which are Ch. 3 and Ch. 4 in the book Form 
and Being.
Thomas expressly teaches that the terms of  the primary axioms belong to 
metaphysics or wisdom59.
It is not necessary to know of  the existence of  immaterial being in order 
to perform such an abstraction.
I will send you, also, a copy of  an as yet unpublished paper, criticizing 
Ralph McInerny’s conception of  the entry into metaphysics. The paper, 
which I gave at the American Maritain Assn. meeting at Notre Dame in 
200760 (though the paper is somewhat expanded), explains how I treat the 
concept of  ens as primary.
29. L.I.: I am doing research into the Metaphysical foundation of  human 
dignity. I have been reading your paper on dignity. This is very helpful, but I 
have some questions: some Thomists say that the foundation of  human dig-
nity is the “personal being.” This is its “formal constituent” (constitutivo formal) 
what distinguishes person from mere nature. Could you tell me, please, what 
do you think about this?
L.D.: A problem I see in looking at “personal being” as the answer is 
that this expression: “personal being” itself  requires explanation. When we 
look for the explanation, we find that we are sent to “having some dignity”61, 
and the “dignity” is there explained in terms of  “subsisting in the rational 
nature.”
59 C.f. ST 1-2.66.5.ad 4.
60 Fr. Dewan is referring to the paper: “First Known Being and the Birth of Metaphysics”.
61 C.f. ST 1.29.3.ad 2.
Conversations with Fr. Dewan
Central Metaphysical Topics with Lawrence Dewan, O.P.
64
There are many expressions used in that article that are extremely helpful. 
Notice, e.g., this in the ad 1 (ST 1.29.3):
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet nomen “personae” in Scriptura veteris 
vel novi testamenti non inveniatur dictum de Deo, tamen id quod nomen 
significat, multipliciter in sacra Scriptura invenitur assertum de Deo; scilicet 
QUOD EST MAXIME PER SE ENS, ET PERFECTISSIME INTELLIGENS.
It seems to me that one is driven back to what one finds in the same 
article, in the answer to objection 2, i.e. that we start with the “famous men” 
that are represented in dramas, i.e. in tragedies and comedies; and then move 
to those humans in general who “have dignity”, i.e. we might say “are really 
somebody.” And we come to this:
Propter quod quidam definiunt personam, dicentes quod “persona est hypostasis 
proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinente.” Et quia magnae dignitatis 
est in rationali natura subsistere, ideo omne individuum rationalis naturae 
dicitur “persona,” ut dictum est. Sed dignitas divinae naturae excedit omnem 
dignitatem, et secundum hoc maxime competit Deo nomen “personae.” 
(ST 1.29.3.ad 2).
So we come to the question: what is so special about intelligence?
I would move from there to such an article as ST 1.14.1 and thus in 
general to the immateriality of  some forms. That hierarchy of  grades of  
immateriality of  forms is a good place to be. This will also take you to q. 18, 
especially aa. 2-4, on the life of  the intelligent being.
To bring “esse” more into the discussion, a very good text is ST 1-2.18.1. 
Another relates to the human soul and its various modes of  esse. But 
ultimately we must look at ST 1.5.1. I would say that the ad 1 of  1.5.1 is the 
best lesson on the relation between “good” and “being”.
Also we must look at modus species and ordo, (ST 1.5.5) where one sees 
something about the implications of  form; and 1-2.85.4 regarding form and 
esse in that context.
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Conclusions
Throughout Fr. Dewan’s answers we can confirm the idea that the rela-
tion between form and being is actually complex. In fact, being, form, divine 
causality, nature, existence, are all primary notions before which mind has to 
make the effort to understand them articulately, i.e. as they are given in reality. 
What makes Lawrence Dewan´s approach especially attractive is his 
brilliant effort to show the existential articulation between notions which, 
due to the habit of  studying them separately, we may understand as being 
separate in reality. It may be stated, then, that his view about those notions 
is, therefore, more existential. They are all studied and analyzed from “the 
viewpoint of  being.” Thus, the risk of  showing them from a somewhat 
rationalistic standpoint is not so great. 
It is not the case that other Thomists have not been trying and are still 
also trying to get an existential grasping of  being, as well as of  form and ens. 
What happens is that Dewan´s insistence on approaching things from the 
viewpoint of  being is something that really characterizes and enlightens all 
his metaphysical thought. 
So, rather than taking sides for whichever Thomistic school one wishes to 
‘fight’ for, the spirit guiding the publication of  these conversations is to show 
the broad-mindedness and greatness of  views that invite us and challenge us 
again and again in the philosophy of  Saint Thomas Aquinas, a philosophy as 
splendid and dynamic as is reality itself. 
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